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Abstract
This paper examines a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model containing
flexible prices, search frictions and nominal wage contracts. It is assumed that the nominal
hourly wage rate and the hours of work are jointly determined, so-called efficient bargaining,
for each period. The frictional labor markets reasonably reflect the volatility of real variables
and the fact that productivity is no longer countercyclical. As contract length increases, the
volatilities of the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate increase sharply, but those of output
and total hours worked do not appreciably change.
Keywords: Business Cycles, Labor Market Frictions, Nominal Wage Contracts
3
1 Introduction
This paper studies a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE, henceforth) model containing
flexible prices, search frictions and the wage contracts examined in Cho and Cooley (1995). As Janko
(2008) argues, the Cho-Cooley framework does not capture the business cycle statistics of the U.S.
economy, and this limits the theory considerably. Once Cho-Cooley’s nominal wage contracts are
incorporated into real business cycle models, nominal rigidities improve the monetary transmission
and amplification mechanisms, but they lead to unrealistically high volatility among real variables
as well as countercyclical productivity. In this paper, I attempt to incorporate Cho and Cooley
(1995)’s monetary model to show that search frictions and wage bargaining play a crucial role in
overcoming limitations of the model.
In this paper, I follow Cho and Cooley (1995)’s assumption that the future nominal wage rate
is agreed to, but my approach differs with respect to contract regime: While the nominal wage rate
in Cho and Cooley (1995) is derived from the decision rule of the model without contract, assuming
that the contract wage rate is the expected market-clearing level of the wage rate, I derive the
contract wage counterpart from the solution to a forward-looking Nash bargaining problem. This
is a crucial component in explaining why firms and workers enter into the nominal contracts. Wage
contracts in my model are based on bargaining between workers and firms due to the coordination
failure raised from labor market frictions.
This paper also investigates the reason why the Cho-Cooley’s nominal wage contracts incor-
porated into the equilibrium business cycle model hardly leads to results that better match the
U.S. data, and thus it highlights the importance of labor market frictions and efficient bargaining,
which reveals what has not yet been examined in the literature. Under the nominal contracting
arrangements in Cho and Cooley (1995), employees and firms agree upon the nominal hourly wage
rate in advance and firms are free to choose employment on the hours margin at the wage rate.
This is referred to as the right-to-manage (RTM, henceforth) approach. Under Cho-Cooley’s RTM
framework, firms adjust to shocks during the contract period by choosing hours to equate the
marginal product of labor to the realized real wage. Consequently, the volatility of hours worked
and that of output are unrealistically high. This issue is raised not only for the flexible price model
but for the New-Keynesian model. Christoffel et al. (2009) examine a New-Keynesian model with
staggered wages and report that the model, combined with an RTM assumption, does not replicate
the dynamics of hours worked, because hours per worker remain far too volatile relative to data.
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On the other hand, the existing RTM framework does not allow employment to have an effort
dimension, even though it could better capture actual labor contracts.1 If labor input varies due to
responses in effort as well as hours, the impact of wage rigidities on hours worked can be offset by
variations in effort at work.2 As a reasonable approximation for bargaining, therefore, I assume ef-
ficient bargaining under which the nominal wage rate and the hours of work are jointly determined.
Little attention has been paid to the role of labor market frictions with efficient bargaining as a
way to resolve Cho-Cooley’s unrealistic degree of real variable volatility, and thus this paper is a
contribution on this issue.
Once search frictions and the Cho-Cooley’s nominal wage contracts are incorporated into the
flexible price model, the model no longer generates unrealistically high volatility among real variables
and countercyclical productivity. In all the models with different contract lengths, the volatilities
of output and total hours worked are not greater than those found in the U.S. data, and pro-
ductivity remains highly procyclical during the business cycle. In addition, the volatilities of the
unemployment rate and the vacancy rate rise significantly as contract length rises.
There are several papers in the real business cycle literature that have studied the implications
of nominal wage contracts in the transmission of monetary shocks. Cho (1993) first examines the
quantitative implications of one-period nominal wage contract. Cho and Cooley (1995) study the
properties of model economies with multi-period wage contracts. Cho et al. (1997) quantitatively
estimate the welfare cost of nominal wage contracting. Recently, Janko (2008) adds empirically
plausible labor adjustment costs to the Cho and Cooley (1995) model to overcome some of the
shortcomings otherwise present with nominal wage rigidities. Janko (2008), however, does not
discuss unemployment and vacancies.
When it comes to labor market frictions, Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) first bring the
concept into a real business cycle model. Later, Shimer (2005) discusses the lack of an amplification
mechanism in the context of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and matching model. Shimer
(2005) finds that the wage bargaining process is a source of the inability that amplifies shocks. The
bargaining wage is very volatile, because it absorbs most of the shocks, and the cyclical movements
in firms’ incentives to hire are dampened. As a result, Hall (2005) and others propose real wage
rigidity which allows firms to have cyclical movement in their incentives to create jobs. Following
1Among others, see Trigari (2006) and Christoffel and Kuester (2008).
2Using a DSGE model with endogenous effort, Bils and Chang (2003) show that workers are willing to trade off
exertion and hours in production.
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Shimer (2005) and Hall (2005), many studies introduce real and nominal wage rigidities into DSGE
models.3 To my knowledge, this paper is the first work that revitalizes Cho and Cooley (1995)’s
model, characterized by nominal wage contracts in a frictional labor market environment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and shows how the nominal
contract wage rate is derived. Section 3 quantifies the model and presents the results of my analyses.
Section 4 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Model
The model economy is a variant of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Cho and Cooley (1995)
which consists of households and firms.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household consisting of a continuum of expected-utility-maximizing, in-
finitely lived individuals with measure 1. Each member has time-separable preferences over her
consumption ct (i) and her labor supply (ht (i) , nt (i)). He/She may be either employed by a firm,
nt (i) = 1, with the hours of work ht (i) or unemployed, nt (i) = 0. Each member’s period utility is
given by  ln ct (i)−B 11+φht (i)
1+φ if nt (i) = 1,
ln ct (i) if nt (i) = 0,
where 1/φ denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of leisure. Following Merz (1995),
I assume that the household serves as a full insurance mechanism by pooling the resources of all
its members. The household allocates total consumption to maximize the sum of household utility
which can be obtained by equalizing the marginal utility of consumption of each household member.
The household which makes all members obtain an identical consumption bundle acts as if it has a
utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln ct −B h
1+φ
t
1 + φ
nt
}
, (1)
3Major studies focus on real wage rigidities based on the New-Keynesian DSGE model, including Krause and
Lubik (2007), Gertler and Trigari (2009), and Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010). All studies employ Hall (2005)’s notion of
a wage norm, but Gertler and Trigari (2009) assume that in each period a subset of firms and workers renegotiate
wage contracts, and modify the conventional Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model to allow for Calvo-type staggered
wage contracts. On the other hand, Gertler et al. (2008) and Gal´ı (2010) incorporate nominal wage rigidities into the
New-Keynesian DSGE model. All those studies introduce nominal wage rigidities in the form of staggered nominal
wage setting a` la Calvo.
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where 0 < β < 1 denotes a discount factor, ct consumption, ht hours worked by each employed
household member, and nt the fraction of employed household members.
The households in this economy are required to hold money to purchase consumption goods.
They face a cash-in-advance constraint of the form:
ct ≤ m˜t−1 + (gt − 1)Mt−1
P˜t
, (2)
where m˜t−1 is money carried over from the previous period, (gt − 1)Mt−1 the lump-sum money
transfer, and P˜t the price level in period t. The gross growth rate of money, gt, is known at the
beginning of each period.
The budget constraint of the representative household can be expressed as
ct + it +
m˜t
P˜t
=
W˜ t−jt
P˜t
nth
t−j
t + (1− nt) b+ rtkt
+pit + τt +
m˜t−1 + (gt − 1)Mt−1
P˜t
, (3)
where it denotes investment in capital, kt; nt the fraction of employed household members; W˜
t−j
t
and ht−jt the nominal hourly wage rate and the hours of work, respectively, determined in period
t − j through bargaining; b unemployment insurance benefits; rt the real rental rate of capital; pit
the profits that the household receives from firms; τt a lump-sum tax. The issue of how bargaining
over nominal wages and hours worked takes place will be further analyzed in the next section.
Employment, nt, evolves according to the following law of motion:
nt+1 = (1− s)nt + ft (1− nt) , (4)
where s is an exogenous separation rate with which employees lose their job each period. (1− s)nt
denotes the existing workforce at the beginning of period t + 1 and ft (1− nt) new hires entering
into employment agreement in period t+ 1, where ft is the worker’s job-finding probability.
Money is injected into the economy through lump-sum transfers. If I let gt denote the growth
rate of money in period t, money follows the process
Mt = gtMt−1. (5)
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The growth rate, gt, is determined in the process
ln gt = ρg ln gt−1 + ε
g
t , (6)
where εgt is a normal random variable with mean 0 and variance σ
2
g .
All consumption mechanisms for household members are equal, through full insurance arrange-
ments. In equilibrium, I focus on the representative household’s problem. I first divide all nominal
variables, m˜t, P˜t, and W˜
t−j
t , by the aggregate money stock, Mt. The representative household’s
maximization problem is then
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln
(
mt−1 + gt − 1
gtPt
)
−B (h
t−j
t )
1+φ
1 + φ
nt
}
(7)
subject to
mt
Pt
+ kt+1 =
W t−jt
PtΠ
j
i=1gt+1−i
nth
t−j
t + (1− nt) b+ (rt + 1− δ) kt + pit + τt
nt+1 = (1− s)nt + ft (1− nt) ,
where Pt ≡ P˜t/Mt, W t−jt ≡ W˜ t−jt /Mt−j , and mt−1 ≡ m˜t−1/Mt−1. Note that the expression
Πji=1gt+1−i links the real hourly wage rate to the monetary shocks realized between period t− j and
period t.4
The representative household aims at choosing contingent plans for {kt+1,mt}, taking the nomi-
nal hourly wage rate and the hours of work as given. The first-order conditions for the maximization
imply
µt = βEt
[
1
ct+1
Pt
gt+1Pt+1
]
, (8)
µt = βEt [µt+1 (rt+1 + 1− δ)] , (9)
where µt is the marginal utility of income in period t, i.e., the multiplier attached to the budget
constraint. In equilibrium, it follows that mt = Mt = 1. The equilibrium cash-in-advance constraint
4Let me define Πji=1gt+1−i = 1 if j = 0.
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implies that consumption is the reciprocal of the price level,
ct =
1
Pt
. (10)
I denote by Vt the worker’s surplus, if another household member is employed:
5
Vt =
W t−jt
PtΠ
j
i=1gt−i+1
ht−jt − b−B
(ht−jt )1+φ
1 + φ
1
µt
+ β (1− s− ft)Et
[
µt+1
µt
Vt+1
]
. (11)
2.2 Firms
Firms produce output, yt, using capital, kt, and labor, nth
t−j
t , under a constant returns to scale
technology:
yt = ztk
α
t (nth
t−j
t )
1−α, (12)
where zt is an aggregate productivity shock, and h
t−j
t is the hours of work, determined through
bargaining in period t− j. The productivity shock follows an AR(1) process in logs:
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + εzt , (13)
where εzt is a normal random variable with mean 0 and variance σ
2
z . It is assumed that ε
z
t is
independent of εgt and that the technology shock is known at the beginning of each period before
decisions are made.
The hiring rate, xt, is defined as the ratio of new hires, qtvt, to the existing employment, nt:
xt =
qtvt
nt
, (14)
where qt is the probability that each vacancy, vt, will be filled. The total employment is the sum of
the number of workers not being laid off, (1− s)nt, and new hires, qtvt, equivalent to xtnt:
nt+1 = (1− s)nt + xtnt. (15)
It is assumed that firms incur labor adjustment costs, denoted by κ2x
2
tnt. Given the adjustment
5One can derive the worker’s surplus by taking the derivative of the household’s indirect utility function with
respect to nt, subject to the budget constraint and the law of motion for employment. It is expressed in terms of
current consumption of final goods.
9
costs, the expected discounted sum of real profits for the firm is given by
Ft = ztk
α
t (nth
t−j
t )
1−α − W˜
t−j
t
P˜t
nth
t−j
t − rtkt −
κ
2
x2tnt + βEt [ψt+1Ft+1] , (16)
where ψt+1 = µt+1/µt. In what follows, I assume that matched firms and workers bargain about the
nominal hourly wage rate and the hours of work and that the firms choose the amount of capital
given the hours of work. Notice that the period real profits for the firm in Eq. (16) is linear in the
level of employment, nt, so that the value of the marginal worker for the firm, Jt ≡ ∂Ft/∂nt, is
given by
Jt = ztk
α
t (h
t−j
t )
1−α − W˜
t−j
t
P˜t
ht−jt − rtkt −
κ
2
x2t + β (1− s+ xt)Et [ψt+1Jt+1] , (17)
where kt is kt/nt. The firm’s hiring decision is found as the derivative of Jt with respect to xt:
κxt = βEt [ψt+1Jt+1] . (18)
Rewriting Eq. (17) as the firm’s value of the marginal worker gives:
Jt = ztk
α
t (h
t−j
t )
1−α − W
t−j
t
PtΠ
j
i=1gt−i+1
ht−jt − rtkt +
κ
2
x2t + (1− s)κxt. (19)
Given the hours of work, the first-order condition with respect to kt equalizes the marginal product
of capital to its rental rate:
rt = αztk
α−1
t (h
t−j
t )
1−α. (20)
In this economy, there is another technology which describes how matches take place. The
so-called matching technology or a matching function can be expressed as follows:
Mt = ηuξtv1−ξt , (21)
where Mt is the total number of matches or hires; ut the number of unemployed workers; vt the
aggregate number of vacancies. Assuming that the size of labor force is fixed, the number of
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unemployed workers is ut = 1− nt. The probability a firm fills its vacancy, qt, is given by
qt =
Mt
vt
, (22)
and the probability an unemployed worker finds a job, ft, is given by
ft =
Mt
ut
. (23)
Finally, combining the household’s equilibrium budget constraint and the value of the firm, under
the binding cash-in-advance constraint, yields the aggregate resource constraint:
ct + kt+1 +
κ
2
x2tnt = yt + (1− δ) kt. (24)
2.3 Bargaining over Wages and Hours
The nominal wage contract set up in this section follows Cho and Cooley (1995), where at the
beginning of each period agents agree to a contract arranged for j periods ahead at a time. In the
case when j = 2, at time t workers and firms agree to a nominal wage rate for period t+ 2, and the
firms pay to employees the nominal wage rate agreed upon in period t − 2; at t + 1, they agree to
a wage rate for period t+ 3, and the firms pay to employees the nominal wage rate agreed upon in
period t− 1. This process repeats over time.
Once the labor market is characterized by search frictions, the firm and the worker enter into
bargaining over the nominal hourly wage rate and hours worked under the generalized Nash bar-
gaining framework. The nominal hourly wage rate, W tt+j , and hours worked, h
t
t+j , in time t + j
are agreed upon in period t by both parties, where the hourly wage rate and hours worked jointly
maximize the Nash product after the aggregate shocks are realized:
(
W tt+j , h
t
t+j
)
= arg max
(
βjEt
µt+j
µt
Vt+j
)γ (
βjEt
µt+j
µt
Jt+j
)1−γ
, (25)
where γ denotes the worker’s bargaining power in wage negotiations, and the surpluses for a matched
worker and a matched firm are given by Eq. (11) and (19), respectively. At the time of the contract,
the nominal wage is paid to all employees, and they supply the work as specified in the contract.
Under this nominal wage contract rule, new hires are paid the same nominal wage pre-determined
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through bargaining between firms and workers who have agreed on a contract.
The first-order conditions with respect to the nominal hourly wage rate, W tt+j , and the hours of
work, htt+j , at time t+ j, are given by
(1− γ)Et
[
µt+j
µt
Vt+j
]
= γEt
[
µt+j
µt
Jt+j
]
(26)
B
(
htt+j
)φ 1
µt
= Et
[
µt+j
µt
(1− α)zt+jkαt+j(htt+j)−α
]
. (27)
The nominal hourly wage rate chosen by a firm-worker match is derived from the expected dis-
counted surplus of firms and workers. The hours of work is chosen by the match such that the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equated to the expected dis-
counted value of marginal product of labor. In this paper, the economies are approximated by
log-linearization around the steady state, because those models with nominal contracts cannot be
solved analytically.
3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Calibration
I set the discount factor β to .99 implying an interest rate of one percent per quarter. Capital’s
share of total income, α, is calibrated to be .33, and δ is set equal to .025. The worker’s bargaining
power in wage negotiations, γ, is set to .5 and the unemployment insurance benefits, b, to about
40 percent of the steady state (real) bargaining wage. The elasticity of the matching function,
ξ, is set to .5, consistent with the literature. I set the steady-state value of worker’s job-finding
probability, f , to .6, which implies an average duration of unemployment of 1.67, as reported by
Cole and Rogerson (1999). The steady-state unemployment rate, u, is set to 6 percent per quarter,
and the labor force size is normalized to unity. Given the job-finding rate and the employment
rate, the exogenous separation, s, is pinned down from the steady state version of the law of motion
for employment, n = f/ (s+ f), so that s = .0383. The steady state level of hours worked, h,
is normalized to 1/3, and utility parameter B is adjusted accordingly. Following Chang and Kim
(2006), I set the intertemporal substitution elasticity of leisure to .4, which implies φ = 2.5. The
adjustment cost parameter κ and the real bargaining wage W/P are jointly determined from the
steady state of the model, so that κ = 24.895 and W/P = 1.992.
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The parameters governing the money growth rate, ρg and σg, are set to .49 and .00623, re-
spectively, as used by Cooley and Quadrini (1999). Finally, the parameters, ρz and σz, control the
process for technology shocks. The parameter ρz is assigned the value .95, a value commonly used
in the related literature. The parameter σz is set to .005, which allows the model economy with
period-by-period wage bargaining to match the actual volatility of aggregate output, around 2.1%.
Table 1 summarizes the set of parameters used in the simulation.
<<< Table 1 >>>
3.2 Findings
I investigate to what extent the model economy with wage contracts following Cho and Cooley
(1995), as well as frictional labor markets, is able to amplify the monetary and real shocks. Table 2
presents the standard deviations of output and other key variables of interest. To evaluate predictive
accuracy, I first present the relevant statistics obtained from the U.S. quarterly data between 1956
and 2005. The output measure y is production in the non-farm business sector. Consumption c is the
sum of personal consumption expenditures of nondurables and services, deflated by the associated
price indices plus real government consumption expenditures. Investment i is the sum of real
private domestic investment and real personal consumption expenditures of durables. Employment
n is measured, using the quarterly average number of non-farm employees. Hours h are average
weekly hours for the non-farm business sector. Unemployment u is quarterly averages of monthly
data from the Current Population Survey. Vacancy v is the quarterly average of monthly help-
wanted indices, constructed by the Conference Board. The real wage w is real hourly compensation
in the non-farm business sector. All data are seasonally adjusted and HP-filtered with smoothing
parameter 1,600.
Summary statistics for the models subject to both monetary and technology shocks, as well as
the results from the monetary shocks and technology shocks, are presented. Statistics for the model
economies are computed by simulating for 200 periods and by repeating the simulation 100 times.
This highlights the role of each shock and enables to determine the relative importance of each
shock, as nominal wage contracts and search frictions are introduced.
<<< Table 2 >>>
The results from the basic model with period-by-period wage bargaining show low volatility
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for the labor market variables. Compared to the volatility of output, for example, the relative
standard deviations of employment (n), unemployment (u), and vacancies (v) are .12, 1.83, and
2.13, respectively. The results demonstrate that the model in which the nominal wage rate is
Nash-bargained in every period lacks amplification mechanisms.6 This result is consistent with
Gal´ı (2010) that realistic labor market frictions seem to have limited effects on the economy’s
equilibrium dynamics. The basic model shows that monetary shocks are not propagated in this
economy. Technology shocks generate most of the observed volatility in output (y). The basic
model with both shocks returns essentially the same results as the model with technology shocks
only.
Cho and Cooley (1995) find unrealistically high fluctuations in output and total hours worked,
as multi-period nominal wage contracts are incorporated. First, in the case of two-period contracts,
output is more than twice as volatile as it is in the model without contracts. Second, total hours
worked in the one-period contract case fluctuate more than output. These dramatic increases in
volatility are attributed to the strong monetary transmission mechanism induced by nominal wage
contracts. Under the nominal contracting arrangements in Cho and Cooley (1995), households and
firms enter into a wage contract and agree upon the nominal wage set in advance. The specified
equilibrium nominal wage satisfies that expected marginal product of labor is equalized to the
expected marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. In addition, the workers
are assumed to cede the firm the right to determine the aggregate hours, leaving firms to maximize
profits. The firms adjust to shocks during the contract period by choosing hours worked to equate
the marginal product of labor to the realized real wage. Consequently, the volatilities of total hours
worked and output are unrealistically high, and labor productivity becomes countercyclical.7
When search frictions are taken into account in the model, nominal wage contracts increase the
volatility of variables but do not produce unrealistically high volatilities in output as well as in total
hours worked. In the case of a four-period contract, the volatility of output and the relative volatility
of total hours worked are 2.13 and .31, respectively. With respect to the labor market variables,
multi-period nominal wage contracts result in higher degree of volatilities. Specifically, the volatility
6In order to have highly volatile labor market variables, Cooley and Quadrini (1999) set the worker’s bargaining
power (or the sharing parameter in their paper) in the range of 0.01-0.1. Decreasing this parameter leads to the higher
volatility of both employment and unemployment. Note that the weaker bargaining power workers hold, the more
rigid real wages become, if the worker’s period value from unemployment is not time-varying. However, a standard
parameter value in the literature is around 0.5.
7Bils and Chang (2003) also show that a model with sticky wages but no effort response predicts a strong negative
relationship between labor productivity and hours worked.
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of employment increased from .12 to .30, unemployment from 1.83 to 4.75, and vacancies from 2.13
to 7.14, under the four-period contract scenario. The corresponding impact on the volatilities of
unemployment and vacancies is notably large.
Table 2 also demonstrates that nominal wage contracts play a crucial role in amplifying monetary
shocks. In the case of a four-period contract, monetary shocks have more weights in generating
fluctuations of employment, unemployment and vacancies than technology shocks. Interestingly,
the impact of monetary shocks on the volatilities of the labor market variables, including real
wages, has more significant effects than that of technology shocks.
Introducing nominal wage contracts slightly decreases the volatility of output from 2.11 to 2.09
(to 2.08) with a one-period contract (with a two-period contract) because hours worked are pre-
determined through efficient bargaining. In the basic model, for example, the log-linearized model
expresses the output as
ŷt = .33k̂t + .67(n̂t + ĥt) + ẑt.
All else being equal, the volatility of hours worked plays an important role for capturing the volatility
of output. The hours of work for the multi-period contract case are less dependent on the state
variables, including shock components, than those for the period-by-period contract case. In the
case of j = 2, for example, the hours of work in period t + 2 are determined in period t when
workers and firms form their expectations about the shocks to be realized two periods later. Since
all shocks have zero mean, under the rational expectations assumption, the state variables become
less persistent, and the hours of work for multi-period contracts are less dependent on the state
variables. This generates less volatile hours worked displayed in Table 2.
The results from the four-period contract model are consistent with the fact that most fluctua-
tions in total hours worked are due to the change in the number of employed. However, employment
and hours worked from the model are about half as volatile as those from the data. Despite the
modeling along the intensive and extensive margin, I do not consider labor force participation. The
task incorporating labor force participation is not trivial, because the model predicts a negative
relation between unemployment and nonparticipation. Without barriers which deter workers from
moving between unemployment and nonparticipation, all the workers choose one out of two states,
unemployment and nonparticipation, along the business cycle, and it leads to the counterfactual
result.8
8In the U.S. data, unemployment is weakly positively correlated with nonparticipation. For studies on the labor
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On the other hand, I investigate efficient bargaining through which nominal wages and hours
worked are jointly determined. Blanchard and Fischer (1989) argue that actual labor contracts
appear only to set a wage and to leave the employment decision to the firm. This is referred to as
the right-to-manage approach on which the firm and the union bargain over the wage, and then the
firm chooses employment freely to maximize profit. The paper of Cho and Cooley (1995) therefore
examines the nominal contracts with the right-to-manage approach. As mentioned, allowing for
right-to-manage bargaining generates excessive volatilities of real variables.
Unfortunately, nominal wage contracts and search frictions lead to large changes in the relative
volatility of the real wages. None of the models with different contract lengths are able to match
the relative volatility found in the U.S. data. For four-period contracts, for example, the real wage
rate depends on the nominal wage rate determined in period t − 4, monetary shock components,
and other state variables. As contract length increases, long-term monetary shocks, realized from
t− 4 through t, make the real wages become more volatile than before.
<<< Table 3 >>>
Table 3 presents the correlations with output. Cho and Cooley (1995) report that produc-
tivity is negatively correlated with total hours worked, and that output is negatively correlated
with real wages and is uncorrelated or positively correlated with prices. From the negative corre-
lation between productivity and total hours worked, one can thus infer that productivity may be
countercyclical.9 By contrast, my model with different lengths of contracts correctly predicts a pos-
itive correlation between output and productivity (a): .99 with one-period contracts and .95 with
four-period contracts. Only monetary shocks, however, make productivity countercyclical, which
becomes more significant as the contract period gets longer. If monetary shocks dominate, I can
then have countercyclical productivity as in Cho and Cooley (1995).
I also look at the correlation between productivity and total hours worked displayed in Table 3.
The correlation coefficient of .91 supports a strong positive correlation with total hours worked in
the basic model. As contract length increases, however, the correlation decreases. The correlation
simulated from the model with four-period contracts, .43, is close to the observed level from the
data, .27. It is also worth noting that the real wage rate is highly procyclical in the basic model
market transitions between employment and unemployment, and that in and out of the labor force, see Veracierto
(2008).
9Cho and Cooley (1995) do not report the correlation between output and productivity.
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with correlation .99, but its procyclicality weakens as the length of the contract increases. Thus,
the correlation between output and real wages is .46 with four-period contracts, which fits closely
to the observed positions.10
Although the models with nominal wage contracts and search frictions overcome limitations
of Cho and Cooley (1995) successfully, the setup predicts weak correlations of unemployment and
vacancies with output when contract length increases. The correlations of unemployment and va-
cancies are -.89 and .99 for one-period contracts, but -.61 and .46 for four-period contracts. Never-
theless, the model with four-period contracts exhibits highly negative correlations of unemployment
for both shocks: -.98 for monetary shocks and -.96 for technology shocks, respectively. There is a
similar pattern to correlations of vacancies with output.
<<< Table 4 >>>
Finally, Table 4 presents the correlations with unemployment. For different contract lengths,
the model is able to produce a negative relationship between unemployment and vacancies, even
though the correlation result of -.60 indicates a weaker relationship in the four-period contract case.
Interestingly, the relative importance of monetary shocks in the negative relation between unem-
ployment and vacancies increases at longer periods. When only monetary shocks are considered, the
correlation is -.18 in the model with two-period contracts, while it is -.53 with four-period contracts.
The model is also able to account for a negative relationship between unemployment and total
hours worked. The correlation between unemployment and total hours worked of the model with
four-period contracts is -.96, close to the level seen in the U.S. data of -.94. As contract length
increases, the volatilities of employment and unemployment are much more driven by monetary
shocks than technology shocks, while hours worked remain less volatile for either shock. The
cyclical behaviors of total hours worked then are explained mainly by those of employment, where
employment moves in the exact opposite direction of unemployment over the business cycle.
On the other hand, the model shows that there is no systematic relationship between unemploy-
ment and real wages. The correlation is -.13 for the U.S. economy over the last fifty years, while
the correlation is -.14 for three-period contracts and .14 for four-period contracts. The results do
not seem to be quite different from data. For the relationship between unemployment and hours
worked, however, none of the models have found a negative relationship at all in the U.S. data.
10When it comes to the price level, it is the reciprocal of consumption and moves in the opposite direction of
consumption over the business cycle. The price level is negatively correlated with output.
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4 Conclusion
This paper examines a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model containing flexible
prices, search frictions and nominal wage contracts. Due to search frictions, a firm-worker pair
negotiates its future nominal wage rate based upon the expected value for the future surplus through
the match. This study assumes efficient bargaining under which the trade takes place between the
firm and the worker in both the wage rate and the hours of work.
Once the flexible price model accounts for search frictions as well as Cho-Cooley’s nominal
wage contracts, it hardly produces unrealistically high volatility of real variables or countercyclical
productivity. In my model, as the contract period gets longer, the volatilities of the unemployment
rate and the vacancy rate increase significantly. Moreover, the volatility of output does not increase
for a longer contract period.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameters Descriptions Values
β discount factor .99
δ depreciation rate .025
ξ elasticity of the matching function .5
α capital share .33
γ worker’s bargaining power .5
b unemployment insurance benefits .7970
f job-finding probability .6
n employment rate .94
φ inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of leisure 2.5
B utility parameter 2.8661
κ adjustment cost parameter 24.8954
s exogenous separation rate .0383
w real bargaining wage 1.9924
ρz aggregate shock persistence parameter .95
ρg persistence parameter of shock to the money growth rate .49
σz standard deviation of the aggregate shock .005
σg standard deviation of the shock to the money growth rate .00623
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Table 2: Standard Deviations
Relative to the Volatility of Output
y c i n h nh u v w a
U.S. Economy 2.09 .36 2.86 .61 .24 .74 5.31 6.36 .43 .50
Basic Model
Both shocks 2.11 .74 2.39 .12 .12 .18 1.83 2.13 .81 .83
Monetary shock only .04 8.61 26.77 .13 .45 .38 2.08 2.42 1.25 1.21
Technology shock only 2.11 .72 2.33 .12 .12 .18 1.82 2.12 .81 .83
1-Period Contract Model
Both shocks 2.09 .74 2.38 .12 .11 .18 1.84 2.14 .92 .84
Monetary shock only .04 8.69 27.61 .14 .39 .29 2.13 2.48 24.60 1.24
Technology shock only 2.09 0.73 2.32 .12 .11 .18 1.84 2.14 .80 .84
2-Period Contract Model
Both shocks 2.08 .74 2.38 .13 .10 .19 2.09 2.88 1.04 .84
Monetary shock only .10 3.30 11.06 1.09 .27 .92 17.11 36.49 14.15 .55
Technology shock only 2.08 .73 2.31 .12 .10 .18 1.90 2.26 .79 .84
3-Period Contract Model
Both shocks 2.09 .74 2.39 .20 .09 .23 3.08 4.71 1.16 .84
Monetary shock only .23 1.49 5.72 1.31 .22 1.18 20.55 35.99 7.84 .44
Technology shock only 2.08 .73 2.31 .13 .09 .18 2.04 2.51 .79 .84
4-Period Contract Model
Both shocks 2.13 .74 2.41 .30 .09 .31 4.75 7.14 1.25 .82
Monetary shock only .41 .93 4.21 1.36 .19 1.26 21.36 33.73 5.14 .43
Technology shock only 2.09 .73 2.31 .14 .08 .19 2.26 2.84 .77 .84
Notes: Data (1956:I-2005:IV) are seasonally adjusted and HP filtered with smoothing parameter
1,600. y = production in non-farm business; c = real personal consumption expenditures of non-
durable goods and services + real government consumption expenditures; i = real gross private
investment + real personal consumption expenditures of durables ; n = employed persons in the
non-farm business sector; h = average weekly hours; nh = total hours worked; u = unemployed per-
sons from the Current Population Survey; v = help-wanted indices; w = real hourly compensation;
a = labor productivity (y/nh).
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Table 3: Correlations with Output
correlations with output
c i h nh u v w a (a, nh)
U.S. Economy .65 .94 .72 .87 -.84 .90 .24 .70 .27
Basic Model
Both shocks .87 .89 .56 .94 -.89 .99 .99 .99 .91
Monetary shock only .33 -.18 -.61 -.40 -.94 .95 .93 .95 -.65
Technology shock only .90 .91 .57 .94 -.89 .99 .99 .99 .92
1-Period Contract Model
Both shocks .87 .89 .52 .91 -.90 .99 .84 .99 .87
Monetary shock only .18 -.03 -.81 -.75 -.96 .99 .11 .99 -.85
Technology shock only .90 .91 .52 .91 -.90 .99 .98 .99 .87
2-Period Contract Model
Both shocks .87 .89 .46 .87 -.86 .78 .70 .99 .81
Monetary shock only -.03 .44 -.86 .85 -.93 .15 -.30 .37 -.17
Technology shock only .90 .91 .47 .89 -.93 .99 .97 .99 .84
3-Period Contract Model
Both shocks .87 .89 .36 .77 -.71 .55 .58 .98 .65
Monetary shock only .09 .70 -.83 .94 -.97 .38 -.47 -.27 -.59
Technology shock only .90 .91 .41 .88 -.95 .97 .96 .99 .83
4-Period Contract Model
Both shocks .87 .90 .22 .67 -.61 .46 .46 .95 .43
Monetary shock only .28 .84 -.81 .96 -.98 .51 -.54 -.49 -.72
Technology shock only .90 .91 .34 .88 -.96 .94 .96 .99 .83
Notes: Corr (y, n) = −Corr (y, u) and Corr (y, P ) = −Corr (y, c)
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Table 4: Correlations with Unemployment
c i h nh v w a
U.S. Economy -.57 -.78 -.56 -.94 -.93 -.13 -.29
Basic Model
Both shocks -.93 -.65 -.19 -.75 -.94 -.93 -.90
Monetary shock only -.24 .10 .63 .41 -.95 -.90 -.91
Technology shock only -.96 -.66 -.19 -.75 -.94 -.93 -.90
1-Period Contract Model
Both shocks -.93 -.66 -.15 -.80 -.94 -.82 -.90
Monetary shock only -.25 .10 .72 .59 -.95 -.11 -.91
Technology shock only -.96 -.68 -.15 -.80 -.94 -.95 -.90
2-Period Contract Model
Both shocks -.82 -.71 -.11 -.85 -.70 -.54 -.83
Monetary shock only .20 -.58 .77 -.98 -.18 .41 -.01
Technology shock only -.96 -.74 -.17 -.85 -.91 -.98 -.92
3-Period Contract Model
Both shocks -.59 -.66 .04 -.91 -.57 -.14 -.59
Monetary shock only .03 -.77 .78 -.99 -.41 .52 .49
Technology shock only -.94 -.80 -.21 -.89 -.86 -.98 -.94
4-Period Contract Model
Both shocks -.45 -.64 .22 -.96 -.60 .14 -.38
Monetary shock only -.16 -.90 .77 -.99 -.53 .58 .65
Technology shock only -.90 -.85 -.23 -.92 -.82 -.96 -.94
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A Steady State and Linearized Economy
The appendix presents the steady state of the model economy with period-by-period nominal wage
and hours worked bargaining, and the equilibrium conditions linearized around the steady state.
Further discussion of the linearized economy with multi-period nominal wage bargaining is in a
separate technical appendix available upon request.
A.1 Steady State
Given the steady state job-finding (f) and the employment rate (n), the exogenous separation is
derived from the employment dynamics:
s =
1− n
n
f,
Note that the firm’s hiring rate is equal to the separation rate, i.e., x = s. From the household’s
first-order condition, the real interest rate is given by r = 1/β− 1 + δ. Given the steady state hours
of work (h), the capital-to-employment rate (k) is equal to
k =
(α
r
)1/(1−α)
h.
The aggregate capital stock, output, and investment are given by k = nk, y = kα(nh)1−α, and
i = δk, respectively.
The steady state bargained wage and hours of work satisfy
W
P
h = γ
(
(1− α)y + κ
2
x2 + fκx
)
+ (1− γ)
(
b+B
h1+φ
1 + φ
1
µ
)
,
λ = (1− α)kαh−α,
where y = k
α
h1−α and the marginal rate of substitution of leisure λ = Bhφ/µ. In the steady state,
the first-order condition for firm’s hiring rate can be expressed as
κx = β
{
(1− α)y − W
P
h+
κ
2
x2 + (1− s)κx
}
= β
(1− α)y − WP h
1− β (1− s+ x2) .
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The steady state real wage, WP , solves the following:(
1− (1− γ)ρ+ γ β
(
f + x2
)
1− β (1− s+ x2)
)
W
P
h = γ(1− α)y
(
1 +
β
(
f + x2
)
1− β (1− s+ x2)
)
+ (1− γ) λh
1 + φ
,
where ρ is the replacement ratio of unemployment insurance benefits such that b = ρ(W/P )h. Given
the real bargained wage, the labor adjustment cost parameter κ is determined. From the market
clearing condition, the aggregate consumption is given by
c = y − i− κ
2
x2n.
The steady state level of price is P = 1/c, and the Lagrange multiplier is then µ = β/P . The
parameter of the utility function B is determined by
B = λµh−φ.
A.2 Linearized Model Economy
In this subsection, the log-linearized model economy with period-by-period bargaining is presented.
The log-linearized equations of the representative household’s first-order conditions are given by
µ̂t = P̂t − Et [ĝt+1] , (A-1)
µ̂t = Etµ̂t+1 + [1− β (1− δ)]Etr̂t+1. (A-2)
The log-linearized cash-in-advance constraint and budget constraint (resource constraint in equi-
librium) are given by
ĉt = −P̂t,
ŷt =
c
y
ĉt +
i
y
ît +
κ
2
x2
n
y
(2x̂t + n̂t) .
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Output, the hiring rate, and capital demand are given by
ŷt = ẑt + αk̂t + (1− α) ĥt
x̂t = Etµ̂t+1 − µ̂t + βEtx̂t+1
+
β
κx
Et
[
(1− α)yŷt+1 −
W
P
h
(
Ŵt+1 − P̂t+1 + ĥt+1
)]
r̂t = ẑt − (1− α) k̂t + (1− α)ĥt,
where ŷt = n̂t + ŷt and k̂t = n̂t + k̂t. The law of motion for the capital stock and the shock process
are
k̂t+1 = (1− δ) k̂t + δ̂it
ẑt = ρz ẑt−1 + ε̂zt .
The linearized nominal wage and hours worked are given by
W
P
h(Ŵ tt − P̂t + ĥt) = γ
(
(1− α)yŷt + κx(x+ f)x̂t + κxff̂t
)
+ (1− γ) λh
1 + φ
(λ̂t + ĥt)
λ̂t = φĥt − µ̂t
= ẑt + αk̂t − αĥt.
The linearized labor market variables are summarized as
M̂t = ξût + (1− ξ) v̂t
n̂t+1 = (1− s) n̂t + sM̂t
ût = −1− u
u
n̂t
f̂t = M̂t − ût
q̂t = M̂t − v̂t
x̂t = q̂t + v̂t − n̂t.
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